讲座题目：Advertising Format and Content Provision on Revenue-Sharing Content PlatformsA Responsive-Pricing Retailer Sourcing from Competing Suppliers Facing DisruptionsA Responsive-Pricing Retailer Sourcing from Competing Suppliers Facing Disruptions
The digital content market has grown dramatically in recent years. Many platforms （e.g., YouTube, Twitch, and Instagram） show ads when consumers watch the content on their platforms, and they share ad revenue with content creators to incentivize them to create and share content. These platforms generally adopt either a uniform-advertising format （i.e., the platforms display the same number of ads irrespective of content quality） or a differentiated-advertising format （i.e., the platforms display the number of ads based on content quality）. This paper shows that, regardless of the ad format, an increase in content homogeneity on the platform can increase the content creators’ profits and the consumer surplus. By contrast, an increase in content homogeneity can benefit the platform under uniform advertising but not under differentiated advertising. Moreover, the equilibrium ad revenue-sharing rate, content quality, and the number of ads shown for each content will be lower under differentiated advertising than under uniform advertising. The platform’s profit and the consumer surplus are also lower under differentiated advertising than under uniform advertising. However, depending on the level of content homogeneity on the platform, the content creators’ profits can be higher or lower under differentiated advertising. In an extension, we also analyze an emerging ad format in which the platform allows content creators themselves to decide the number of ads on their content. Interestingly, we show that this new ad format can make all the market participants （i.e., the platform, the content creators, and the consumers） worse off.
姜宝军，华盛顿大学圣路易斯分校营销学副教授。他于美国格林内尔学院取得经济学与物理学学士学位，于斯坦福大学取得物理学和电子工程硕士学位，于德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校取得工商管理学硕士学位，于卡耐基梅隆大学取得信息系统硕士与博士学位。姜宝军副教授的研究方向包括：分享经济、基于平台的商业模型、渠道、创新、竞争策略、行为经济以及营销与运营的交互。他的研究成果发表在Management Science、Marketing Science、Production and Operations Management以及Journal of Marketing Research等国际顶级期刊。他被美国营销科学学会评为2017年“美国营销科学学会青年学者”。他也是Journal of Marketing Research和Marketing Science 的编委会成员，以及众多国际顶级期刊的审稿人。
We study a problem of a retailer who orders from two competing strategic suppliers subject to independent or correlated disruptions and responds by setting the retail price upon delivery, which we call responsive-pricing. The suppliers compete by setting their wholesale prices. We model this problem as a Stackelberg-Nash game with the suppliers as the leaders and the retailer as the follower, and obtain its equilibrium explicitly. We perform sensitivity analyses with respect to suppliers' production costs, reliabilities, and their correlation. Surprisingly, we find that an increase in the reliability of a supplier may, counter to our intuition, hurt him due to responsive-pricing. Furthermore, in contrast to literature, we find that a high disruption correlation may benefit a supplier who has a cost advantage, because of responsive-pricing, and total order quantity may increase in that correlation due to intense suppliers competition. This paper has important implications for unreliable suppliers because how reliability and
correlation influence their profits depends on the retailer's pricing power and the competition intensity between the suppliers. With a responsive-pricing retailer, a supplier may not benefit from a higher reliability but may benefit from a higher correlation. This explains why a supplier that has a cost advantage may have the incentive to create a positively correlated supply network by building plants in the same geographic location with his competitor, or choosing the same tier 2 supplier to form a ``diamond-shaped" supply chain strategically.欢迎感兴趣的老师和博士生参加！
讲座题目：Growing Pains: Examining the Effects of Generational Product Innovation on Mobile Apps’ Performance